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Introduction
For many years accountants and auditors have assessed the accounts of companies and banks in order to  
provide a true and fair opinion about the value of assets and liabilities and profits and losses. Over these 
years accounting standards have been continuously upgraded to reflect the changes in mainly the financial  
products  on  offer  and  the  risks  incorporated  in  them.  The  latest  standards  are  set  by the  International  
Accounting  Standard  Board  and  are  called  the  International  Financial  Reporting  Standards.  Similarly 
standards have been defined for governments and government  entities in the International  Public Sector  
Accounting  Standards.  In  the  U.K.  the  Financial  Reporting  Council1 is  responsible  for  setting  and 
maintaining accounting standards for the private sector. It combines the works of accountants, actuaries and 
auditors. To establish a true and fair opinion has been made more and more difficult with the introduction of  
complex financial instruments, both for the originators: the banks and insurance companies as well as for the  
users: hedge funds, pension funds, government entities  and the corporate sector.
Accountants,  auditors  and actuaries  always  focus on their  own client  base.  These clients  rarely include 
individual  households,  apart  from in the specific  case  of  tax accounting.  For  the U.K. government,  the  
National Audit Office2 is the responsible audit agency.
What  auditors,  accountants  and  actuaries  actually  do  is  making  sure  that  prevailing  market  prices  are 
properly reflected in the values of assets and liabilities as well as in incomes and expenses. What auditors,  
accountants and actuaries do not do -as it is not within the mandate from their clients- is whether the price 
setting of an individual firm or the collective of firms or of a government causes gains or losses for other  
market  participants,  especially  for  individual  households.  Such  assessment  would  reflect  the  economic  
impact of the drive for profits. 
This article aims to address the question whether there is evidence that the profit motive for one group of 
companies -for instance the banking sector- can actually help to increase or reduce the net worth levels of  
individual  households.  The same question can also be raised for government  funding and its  effects on 
households net worth positions.
The U.K3and the U.S4 produce statistics on the Balance Sheet of Households and Non-Profit Institutions. 
Eurostat does not produce such data for the European Union countries, excluding the U.K.  The U.K. and the  
U.S. data show that there are periods when the aim of banks to make a profit coincides with increases in net  
worth for the individual households. However there are also periods when this is not the case.
Why these situations can arise is the subject of this article.
1. The Home Mortgage Markets
1 http://frc.org.uk/Home.aspx
2 http://www.nao.org.uk/
3 http://www.econstats.com/uk/uk_bb_____80a.htm
4 http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/current/accessible/b100.htm
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1.1 The Economic Value of Homes
If individual households were in a position to buy their home outright without relying on outside sources of  
funds, the question could be asked: What is the economic value of having the use of one’s own home? Is the 
value of living in one’s own home different from one year to the next? How should the acquisition price of 
the home be depreciated over time?
Two elements stand out: 
(1) Generally speaking the owner-occupier does not buy a home for it to be traded in a market place. The aim 
of acquiring a home is to live in it. If there is no aim to trade, there is also no market value as such. There is  
an acquisition price and a potential future sales value as and when the needs of the owner-occupier change 
and a different type of home is required.
(2) The economic life span of homes is usually at least fifty years and in many cases very much longer. Some 
homes need modernisation from time to time, but apart from occasional updating and common maintenance,  
homes require very little else. It is an asset which gives a benefit over an individual’s lifetime and sometimes 
longer than that.
The benefit of living in one’s own home -fully funded from own savings- cannot be expressed in money 
terms in the usual way. One saves rent payments, but why would one compare such savings with the return 
over the original cash lay-out as no rent payments (cash flow) take place? One also saves on the interest  
payments as there has been no borrowing. Again why would one apply current interest rate levels over a 
home acquisition which may have taken place years ago in a totally different interest rate environment? If  
rents and interest rates are not useful in assessing the value of the benefit of living in one’s own home, what  
is? The logical conclusion is to treat one’s home as an asset which is to be depreciated over its useful life.  
The only reasonable yardstick is an equal depreciation amount per annum based on the original purchase  
price,  corrected  only for  the  variation in  households’  real  estate  values  from one year  to  the  next,  but 
depreciated over the remaining life time.
A calculation example may make it clear. Assume Mr Johnson bought a home outright for U.S.$100,000 in  
2007 with an expected life span of say 50 years. This means the depreciation amount is U.S.$2,000 per  
annum. According to the U.S. Balance Sheet of Households as published by the Federal Reserve, home 
values dropped from $20.844 trillion in 2007 till $17.558 trillion in 2008, a drop of 15.8%. If this drop is  
spread out over the remaining lifetime of 49 years, this implies 0.322% per annum. Apply this to $2,000 and 
the depreciation amount becomes $1,993.56 per annum for the remaining 49 years. The dates of 2007 and 
2008 were chosen on purpose, as the drop in home valuation was the steepest for at least 25 years.
The variables are the expected lifetime of the property, the level of home improvements and the level of  
changes in home values, however the latter corrected for the remaining life time period.
In the next section it will be explained why this depreciation method is key to understanding what can go  
wrong when finance gets involved.
1.2 Banks Mortgage Lending Activities
4
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Generally speaking when banks get involved with the funding of home loans, their risk taking is based on  
predicting individual income levels and on the expected future home values. If one studies the trends in the  
U.S. home markets it should be clear in hindsight, that the stress in the home mortgage markets started in 
2006 already.
In the U.S. during the few years preceding 2008, mortgage originators started to have mortgages approved by 
banks on basis of  doubtful principles.  A Deutsche Bank study5 came to the conclusion that 37% of the 
mortgages granted were interest only mortgages; 38% of the mortgages also required no down payment so 
100% of the value of the home was borrowed; 43% of the borrowers were not required to provide any proof 
of income and finally 80% of borrowers were attracted by providing them with a low start up interest rate for 
a period of two years, after which interest rates were hiked steeply.
According to the study, the subprime market segment “only” amounted to U.S$1.2 trillion out of the total 
home mortgage market of U.S$10 trillion.
U.S. investment banks started to package these subprime mortgages into Collateralised Debt Obligations.  
Based on AAA ratings from the U.S. credit rating agencies, the investment banks sold these CDO’s around 
the world, but also to U.S. money market funds. When the real risks to these mortgages appeared, as cash  
flows  faltered,  the  U.S  investment  banks  were  in  no  position  to  maintain  a  market  in  these  CDO’s.,  
something they had promised to do. The CDO’s turned from “going concern” to “liquidation” CDO’s. The 
pricing fell of a cliff and many CDO holders could not get out of the risks. Huge losses on savings were 
made. 
From about 2005 onwards, major errors were made by the mortgage originators and by the mortgage risk  
distributors -the investment banks.
In the United States errors in home mortgage lending decisions can easily be traced back through four types  
of statistics: the foreclosure filings, the level of actual bank repossessions of homes, new housing starts and  
the price developments in the housing market.
The stress in the housing market in the U.S. can be measured in the annual levels of foreclosure filings,  
which  represent  actions  taken  by  lenders  when  borrowers  get  into  a  default  situation.  In  2005  such  
foreclosure filings were 801,563. In 2006 this level increased to 1.215,389, in 2007 the level reached 2.2 
million and in 2008 it moved to 3.1 million. In 2009 it became 3.46 million. In 2010 the level moved further 
up to3.84 million only to reach 3.92 million in 2011. In August 2012 it was still high at 193,508 in a month,  
or 1 in 681 housing units were affected by foreclosure filings. The highest stress level has been 1 in 298 
housing units and the lowest 1 in 317,498 units. The number of housing units repossessed by banks was 
269,000 in 2006, 489,000 in 2007, 679,000 in 2008, 945,000 in 2009, 1.125 million in 2010 and 1.147 
million in 2011.(Source: Statistic Brain.com)
Keeping up with payments on outstanding mortgages is one element of the housing market, new housing 
starts and home values are the other two elements.
The level of new housing starts -monthly figures on a seasonally adjusted annual rate- reached its peak in  
October 2007 at 1.264 million. In January 2008 it dropped to 1.084 million and a year later in January 2009  
it had more than halved to 490,000.(Source: Ycharts.com). The S&P Case Shiller home price index6 dropped 
from 170 by the end of 2007 till 139 a year later.
When new housing starts  drop to half  the level of a year  earlier,  this  affects output (GDP),  households  
income for  those directly and indirectly involved in  the  house building business  and thereby economic 
5 http://www.globalsecuritisation.com/08_gbp/gbp_gssf08_022_031_db_us_subprm.pdf
6 http://www.standardandpoors.com/indices/sp-case-shiller-home-price-indices/en/eu/?indexId=spusa-cashpidff--p-
us----
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growth levels as well as unemployment levels. This also had a strongly negative effect on tax income for the  
U.S. government.
The repossessions of homes represent a different category. Once banks take possession of a home they will 
want to cut their losses on the property. It usually means that the net equity in the property has already been 
wiped out - a loss to a household’s net worth. Secondly the extra supply of “second hand” homes puts home  
values under further severe strain as evidenced by the drop in the S&P Case Shiller index in 2008. Such  
repossessions and sales do nothing for economic growth, as the houses have all been build in earlier periods, 
but they do affect households’ net worth values, through the change in speed of home values’ depreciation.  
The mistake in granting mortgages to people who could not afford such mortgages is that 850,000 rather than 
269,000 used houses came on the market with a for sale sign in 2008. Such extra supply should never have 
occurred; it distorts the true market values for homes. The price setting for homes was based on an error of  
judgment by some banks. It was based on financial markets rather than on real markets considerations.
The clash between the banks’ actions and the interests of their clients -the individual households- became  
evident in 2006 and even more so in 2007. On the one hand some banks and some originators were pushing  
sales of home mortgages without  due regards for risks.  Regretfully for prudent  banks,  the behaviour of 
imprudent lenders affects the prudent banks’ risk portfolios as well. The increased level of foreclosure filings 
in 2006, 2007 and 2008 showed that the banking system collectively had sold mortgages to people who  
could not afford it. They did not have the cash flow to service their debt.
What one should note is that the mortgage periods agreed between banks and their clients do not coincide 
with the lifespan of a property. The mortgage periods will always be substantially shorter than the economic 
lifespan. Secondly home loans are often made on a variable interest rate basis, leaving individual households 
with a home related interest rate risk over their income levels. Usually households have no way of avoiding 
such risk.
What banks do, once they have made their errors in lending, is to try to get the maximum amount of the  
outstanding loan amounts back. They also, as above figures illustrate, try to do this in the shortest possible 
time period. Such financial action, which benefits the banks, forces home market values down. All existing 
borrowers,  but  also the non-borrowers see  their  asset  values  drop.  Usually for at  least  95% of  existing 
borrowers it is not their inability to repay the mortgage, but it is the inability of the say 5% or less who can 
no longer afford the payments and should not have had the mortgages granted in the first place. Mortgage  
availability drops; having to move homes to take up a new job realises the losses in values, so it affects 
labour mobility. The drop in new housing starts has a substantial impact on unemployment levels and on  
consumer demand. 
What forced sales of homes do is to shorten the financial lifespan of a home. Banks increase the speed of 
financial  depreciation of homes  for  their  own profit  motive,  while the individual  household’s  economic 
depreciation  stays  at  practically  the  same  level.   Economic  and financial  lifespan depreciation starts  to  
deviate. This affects the net worth build up by individual households as retained in their own homes. The 
economic value of living in one’s own home does not change for all practical purposes, but the potential 
financial  buffer  of  their  build  up  equity in  their  home  changes.  Bank’s  actions  to  get  out  of  the  non-
performing home loans, negatively affects the net equity position of all individual households which own a 
home. Irresponsible lending practises are translated into having a major negative impact on the financial net  
worth of all home owning individual households. A small group of doubtful home loan borrowers, mainly 
caused by irresponsible lending and risk transferring practices as described in the Deutsche Bank study,  
make all individual households lose equity net worth in their homes, even for those who never borrowed a 
cent. The profit objective of banks led to huge home equity losses for individual households during 2008 and 
following years.
Accountants and auditors were right in assessing that house prices did drop steeply in 2008 and that banks 
had to make provisions for those borrowers who could no longer afford to pay the mortgage sums. However  
the accountancy profession was never asked to assess the size of the depreciation of homes of individual 
owner-occupiers. Economists should have raised this matter.
6
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From the Federal Reserve data on individual households net worth position as per end of 2007 and 2008, one 
can conclude that the households lost $12.6 trillion in net worth values in 2008, which equalled 19.1% of  
such values in a year and represented a loss of 90% of 2008 GDP. If one compares this to the original $1.2 
trillion in sub-prime mortgages, the multiplier effect was more than 10. The losses in home values alone  
were $3.3 trillion in 2008. The remainder came from the problems in the banking sector, in the corporate 
sector through reduced demands and in the government sector.
From  an  economic  point  of  view  with  home  depreciations  representing  a  very  steady  amount,  such 
divergence between financial and economic depreciations should never have occurred. A possible policy  
solution could be found in enhancing economic growth. How this could be done, with the help of economic 
easing policies, has been spelled out in my paper: When Capitalism No Longer Works - A Profit Warning 7. 
The key issue is to use financial savings temporarily to correct the errors of the bankers. The historical errors  
made by the banks can not be undone, not by increasing equity capital requirements, not by splitting up  
investment from retail banks, nor by changing the bank supervisors. It needs banks to improve their credit  
risk judgments skills. It needs education for the bankers from top to bottom. What can be done -as explained 
in above paper- is using pension fund savings temporarily to create extra consumer demand.  Such action  
will help to restore economic growth, get people back into jobs and earnings and help restore net worth  
levels of individual households. When economic growth has reached its long term potential, the tax payers  
could return the savings back to the pension pots. The key group to focus on is the collective of individual  
households and not the banks. Most banks have learned their lessons. The remainder group requires re-
education.
2. Government funding and government debt.
2.1 Government funding
The funding of all economic households, including funding of a government, originates from the individual  
households. They are the ultimate owners of all equity and debt as well as all savings in a society.
For the purpose of this paper it is not necessary to go into details about which section of the society pays  
what kind of taxes; what is important is to what extent are a government’s assets and liabilities matched and 
to which extent is the prevailing level of tax income sufficient to cover government expenses.
The National Audit Office has produced an accountants approach to U.K.’s government assets and liabilities  
and income and expenditure. This is called the “Whole of Government Accounts” The first and only WGA  
statement of accounts was published in 2011 for the fiscal  year  2009-2010. The WGA differs from the 
national accounts in a number of ways. They are however in line with the International Financial Reporting 
Standards. The highlights are reproduced below:
“Whole of Government Accounts 2009-10: At a glance
Although there are other quoted measures of the UK's national debt, such as those produced by the 
Office for National Statistics, the WGA provides, for the first time, an accountant's view of the 
government's financial position. It shows our "current deficit" is £164.5bn whereas our Net Liability 
position (equivalent to the "national debt") to be some £1,211.8bn.
Revenue and Expenditure
7 http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/41671/
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Total revenue: £582bn
Description £bn
Taxation revenue from direct taxes (285.2)
Taxation revenue from indirect taxes (148.0)
Taxation revenue from local taxes (52.1)
Revenue from sales of goods and services (51.0)
Other revenue (45.7)
Total revenue (582.0)
Total expenditure: £665.7bn
Description £bn
Social security benefits 197.1
Staff costs 180.4
Purchase of goods and services 160.9
Cost of grants and subsidies 66.2
Depreciation and impairment charges 51.6
Provision expense (17.0)
Other expenditure 26.5
Total expenditure 665.7
Net financing costs: £80.5bn
Description £bn
Investment revenue (4.3)
Finance costs 34.9
Interest on pension scheme liabilities 58.9
Expected return on funding pension schemes' assets (9.0)
Net financing costs 80.5
Net loss on sale of assets: £0.3bn
Net deficit for the year: £164.5bn
 
Assets and Liabilities
8
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Non-current assets: £953.8bn
Description £bn
Property, plant and equipment 708.0
Investment property 14.6
Intangible assets 36.3
Trade and other receivables 40.0
Equity investment in the public sector banks 65.3
Other financial assets 89.6
Total non-current assets 953.8
Current assets: £253.7bn
Description £bn
Inventories 12.4
Trade and other receivables 125.7
Cash and cash equivalents 8.1
Gold holdings 7.3
Other financial assets 100.2
Total current assets 253.7
Total assets: £1207.5bn
Current liabilities: £355.1bn
Description £bn
Trade and other payables (102.5)
Government borrowing and financing (200.9)
Provisions for liabilities and charges (15.4)
Other financial liabilities (36.3)
Total current liabilities (355.1)
Net current liabilities: £101.4bn
Total assets less current liabilities: £852.4bn
Non-current liabilities: £2,064.2bn
9
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Description £bn
Trade and other payables (73.7)
Government borrowing and financing (764.7)
Provisions for liabilities and charges (86.2)
Net public service pension liability (1,132.3)
Other financial liabilities (7.3)
Total non-current liabilities (2,064.2)
Net liabilities: £1,211.8bn”
By the end of 2012 the next set of WGA data will be published. Discussions are still ongoing about inclusion 
of all government entities such as Network Rail, the Bank of England and the partly nationalised banks,  
which have not been included in above data.
2.2 Government Debt
To stick to the U.K. figures as an example, when the net government debt is £1.212 trillion, the tax revenue 
base is £582 billion and the GDP level stands at £1.279 trillion all in the same year, it will be clear that the 
U.K.’s  government  debt  cannot  be paid back any time soon.  The ultimate  obligors for the debt  are the  
individual  households.  They  already  pay  -directly  and  indirectly-  around  half  of  their  income  to  the  
government. Just to getting back to a balanced budget situation is now predicted to happen by 2018. 
What the current level of debt represents is a very long term obligation on the one hand and on the other  
hand an asset  incorporating the benefits  of  education,  healthcare,  defence and a public infrastructure.  It  
probably  does  not  include  the  social  security  benefits,  which  represent  a  transfer  payment  between  
households in a current year.
The type of assets -government debt- compares well with the homes we live in. The character of the asset is 
for the most  part an intangible asset with a proven long term benefit.  Just like homes for the users, the  
economic value of government bonds could be depreciated in equal amounts over a period to be decided, but 
this period should probably be linked to the average U.K. life expectancy8, which is 80 years. In amounts this 
means  £15.15  billion  in  annual  repayments  plus  interest  amounts.  This  leads  to  the  question  of  the  
appropriate interest rates.  If a loan period stretches out over an 80 year period, it should make no difference  
whether one enters the obligation for a 2, a 5, a 10 or a 30 year period. Each of these loans needs to be rolled 
over till the principal amount is reduced. What is currently happening, both in the U.K, but also in the U.S. 
and in nearly all Eurozone countries, is that the actual level of government debt is increasing rather than  
being reduced. The “banking” question is: Can the individual households collectively repay or at least reduce 
the outstanding government debt level over a period of some 80 years? If the assessment is positive than the 
best debt funding strategy is to gradually switch all debt issuance to 10 and 30 years maturity.  The best 
interest rate strategy would be to provide savers with a fixed return of say 2% over inflation levels for 10 
years bonds and 2.5% for 30 year bonds. Central banks could play a key role in maintaining such interest  
rates.
Currently financial markets do not operate in this manner, because the governments have not made their  
funding strategies clear. For instance, the financial depreciation level of gilts has been manipulated by the 
exercise of quantitative easing, through which the Bank of England has printed money and bought up £366  
billion as of to-day out of a total gilt market of £1.164 trillion. An interesting comment about how much of 
8 http://www.nhs.uk/news/2011/03March/Pages/uk-life-expectancy-still-rising.aspx
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the U.K.’s government deficit was funded by printing money by the Bank of England was made in an article 
in the Daily Telegraph9 of 17th October 2012. Among the observations made is that since August 1, 2012 the 
Debt Management Office sold £34.3 billion in IOU’s and the Bank of England bought £32 billion of them.  
The article concluded that there is a false market in government bonds.
 
My conclusion goes further.  There is a current financial market  price for U.K. gilts,  but this a financial  
market price, which has totally been distorted by quantitative easing and by the effects of capital flight from 
other countries. The economic value assessment of these assets and their depreciation method should be 
given priority over the financial markets liability assessments. The latter “only” reflects to-day’s views on  
how an 80 year obligation could be settled. As seen in other European countries, such views can cause  
capital flight and increased interest rates, which have little to do with the long term ability to pay back 
outstanding government debt. However just as in the case of homes, such financial markets actions can force  
economies into a tailspin.
The  solution  is  of  course  fiscal  discipline,  which  only  stands  for  balancing  the  budgets,  including  the 
provision for interest payments to be kept current and principal amount to be repaid over an 80 year period. 
The solution is also to get people and companies back to work, so that full utilisation is made of all available  
manpower  and  other  resources.  Such action  helps  individual  households  to  earn  more,  spend  more  on 
consumption, save more and yes pay collectively more taxes, not by raising the tax rates, but in having a  
higher income level to distribute.
3. Conclusions
Accountants, auditors and actuaries have been very effective in assessing corporate assets and liabilities as  
well as their incomes and expenses. As the Whole of Government Accounts efforts show, the U.K. and other  
governments have started to get a better grip on their assets and liabilities as well as on their income and  
expenses. What has been the forgotten sector has been the Individual Households. They are the source of all  
wealth creation, but also the victims if the money men -bankers (including other financial sector operators) 
and governments- get their risk assessments wrong and force depreciations of homes and government debt. 
Such depreciations are driven by financial markets -the liability side- and out of line with the economic 
depreciation  of  such  assets  based  on  actual  asset  values.  Company  assets  valuations  are  based  on  the 
economic  value  to  companies;  they  are  not  based  on  how  such  assets  have  been  funded.  The  same  
philosophy should be applied to both the home markets and to government bonds. They both represent assets 
which can be depreciated.
Understanding  the  depreciation  gap  between  the  financial  markets  and  the  economic  method  provides  
possible solutions of how to shorten the adjustment period and how to avoid repeating making the same  
errors in future. Economic easing and appointment of a top macro-economic risk manager were suggested in 
my previous paper: When Capitalism No Longer Works - a Profit Warning.
Drs Kees de Koning
Chorleywood, United Kingdom
18th October 2012
E-mail: keesdekoning008@hotmail.com
9 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/comment/9613297/Britain-will-feel-the-pain-when-the-QE-bubble-finally-
bursts.html
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